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SUPREME COURT'S REQUIREMENTS
-RULES RECENTLY ADOPTED.
The announcement that the Supreme
Court had adopted rules for admission to
that court that would materially change
the rules now existing caused considerable
uneasiness among the students in the Law
School, until they saw the copy of rules as
adopted. The Associated Press sent out a
story from Pittsburg, where the Supreme
Court adopted the rule, to the effect that
persons not admitted to the lower courts
before January 1, 1903, would be required
to take the preliminary examination pre-
scribed by the Supreme Court, and then
wait three years to take the examination
for admission. This rule would materially
affect the standing of every law student
in the State who should not be admitted
before January 1st, hence the uneasiness.
The author of the Associated Press story,
however, misconstrued the rules. Acare-
ful reading of the rules will show that any
person now registered as a student at law
may be admitted to his county court on the
same conditions that now exist, unless his
county board has changed the rules; and
he may take the examination for admis-
sion to the Supreme Court as soon after
admission to the lower court as he desires.
The rule simply prohibits attorneys who
are not admitted to the lower courts be-
fore January 1, 1903, from being admitted
on motion.
The committee appointed by the Supreme
Court to conduct the examination has an-
nounced that a pamphlet, containing ex-
planations of the rules, will be ready for
distribution in a short while.
LAW STUDENTS REGISTERED.
The Board of Law Examiners of Cum-
berland county received many applications
for registration this Fall. Every student in
the Law School who is not registered in
the county in which he resides, made ap-
plication for registration in Cumberland
county, and many of the Law students
who are registered in their home counties,
also registered here.
The Board decided to adopt the same
requirements for registration as those
adopted by the Supreme Court. Accord-
ingly the following resolution was adopted:
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Resolved, That the committee request
court to amend Rule of Court 42, relating
to registration of students-at-law, so that
said rule may require all applicants for
registration, as such students, to pass an
examination on subjects required by Su-
preme Court, (by its rule on the subject
adopted Nov. 11, 1902), in the case of regis-
tration for admission to practice in court.
Provided, that any applicant who produces
a certificate showing that he has satis-
factorily passed the examination for regis-
tration before the State Board of Exatm-
iners, shall be permitted to register in this
county without further examination. Pro-
vided further, that this rule of amendment
shall not take effect until July 1, 1903.
The following persons were permitted to
register, some having passed the examina-
tion prescribed by the Board, others hav-
ing presented certificates that were satis-
factory to the Board:
Ed. S. Dively.
W. L. Houck.
A. B. Vera.
Geo. W. Cisney.
Geo. C. Wolfe.
Paul A. Core.
F. P. Barnhart.
M. S. Kaufman.
A. S. Longbottom.
J. E. Fleitz.
V. B. Boughton.
H. N. Sipes.
David Kaufman.
H. E. Fox.
A. L. Reeser.
J. C. Long.
J. R. Jones.
Leo McDonald.
Leo. J. Schwartzhopf
Carrol T. Reno.
Paul 0. Menge.
Elmer Ehler.
Chas. S. Hassert.
James E. Cary..
Samuel Kauffman.
The Board has conducted its last exami-
nation for this year. The next examina-
tion will be held in February, 1903.
STATE-DICKINSON GAME.
The annual foot ball game between State
College and Dickinson, played in Carlisle,
Nov. 22, resulted in a score of 23 to 0, in
State's favor. The game was the most
interesting ever played between these
teams, and aroused more enthusiasm
among the under graduates of both insti-
tutions than any game heretofore played
by State and Dickinson. Forseveral days
prior to the game, Dickinson's students
assiduously practiced yells and songs, and
held mass meetings, the result of which
wds the exhibition of more spirit on the
day of the game than there has been here of
recent years. Prior to the game the stu-
dents of the several departments of the
College, preceded by the Indian band, con-
ducted a short parade. At the athletic
field, they occupied the east end of the
bleachers, doing good, consistent rooting
during the game. Every department
yelled together and as a result the rooting
was most effective.
State's team came to town Saturday
morning. At noon a special train carry-
ing State's band and 2-50 ardent rooters
arrived. They, also, paraded, and at the
game occupied the bleachers on the north
side of the field. Their cheering was just
as enthusiastic as Dickinson's, and largely
contributed to the success of their team.
The Law students sat between the Col-
lege and the Preparatory School students
at the game. Dively and Fleitz led the
Law delegation. Nearly every man in
the Law School .was there.
The Law men on the team this year
are: Carlin, Amerman, and Barnhart.
HON. L. P. HOLCOMB, LL. B.
One of the recent graduates of the Dick-
inson School of Law to achieve distinction
was L. P. Holcomb, of the class of 1901. At
the recent election he was elected a mem-
ber of the Legislature from the Sixth dis-
trict, Luzerne county, with a large major-
ity.
Mr. Holcomb was born in Askam, Pa.,
about twenty-eight years ago, and resided
there all his life. He attended the public
schools there and in Wilkes-Barre, grad-
uating from the High School in the latter
city. Soon afterward, he was appointed a
clerk in the office of the Recorder of Deeds
of Luzerne county, serving in that capacity
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for several years. Resigning from that
position in 1898, he entered the Dickinsoii
School of Law, being graduated in the
class of 1901 with the degree of LL. B.
Immediately after his graduation, he took
the bar examination in Luzerne county,
and passed creditably the difficult exam-
ination prescribed by the board of exam-
iners of that county. He was admitted to
practice in the several courts of Luzerne
ii the fall of 1901, and since then has es-
tablished a lucrative practice.
The nomination for Representative on
the Republican ticket in the Sixth district,
Mr. Holcomb's home, was given to him
unsolicited, tlie leaders of that party real-
izing that he was the only man in thd dis-
trict who could defeat the Democratic
nominee. Their belief in his strength was
justified, for he was elected by a majority
that was beyond the expectations of his
most sanguine friends.
During the time that Mfr. Holcomb was
a student at this institution, he was popu-
lar with his fellow-students, and held in
high regard by the Faculty. He was a
member of the Delta Chi fraternity, and
was president of his class in his Senior
year.
ALUMNI NOTES.
Hoagland and Schnee of last year's
Middle class were recently admitted to the
Lycoming county bar, having passed the
bar examination of that county.
Guy Thorne, who graduated in the two
years' course in 1902, was admitted to the
Supreme Court when that court was con-
vened in Pittsburg, in October. He is
practicing in Greeneville, Washington
county, and has established a lucrative
business.
Elmer S. Welsh, of last year's Middle
class, did not return this year. Desiring
to take the bar examination in York
county this fall, and the rules of that
county requiring a short apprenticeship in
a law office before students are eligible for
the final examination, he entered an office
in York, where he resides. He will take
his examination in December.
Stevens, '97, of Reading, was in town
during the past month.
E. A. Delaney, of last year's Middle
class, was a candidate for ProthQnotary of
Wayne county, on the Republican ticket,
at the recent election. He was defeated
by a small majority.
Turner, '02, was in town during the past
month, to attend the dance conducted by
the Comus Club. He has been admitted
to the Northampton county bar and is
doing well.
Houser, '02, is located in Lewisburg, Pa.
He'is in partnership with Jno. A. McKee,
an experienced attorney of that place.
Reese, '97, of Plymouth, Pa., has ac-
cepted a position in the legal department
of the D. L. & W. R. R. at Scranton.
At the recent election, S.H. Kirk, '97,
was re-elected to represent Fulton county
in the next House of Representatives. He
is a resident of McConnellsburg and has a
paying practice there.
Shipman, '01, was admitted to the
Lancaster Bar during the summer. He
will practice his profession in Lancaster
county.
Miss Sarah Marvel, class of 1900, was in
town recently, the guest of the Misses
Horn. She was admitted to the Philadel-
phia Bar in the fall of 1900, passing an ex-
amination that called forth the commen-
dation of the Board of Examiners.
Harry P. Katz and Win. Kern, both of
the class of '01, were admitted to the Phila-
delphia Bar during the summer. Both
being residents of Philadelphia, they will
practice there.
Frank and Joe Rhodes, '02, are located
in West Virginia. They have qualified
to practice in that State, and reports from
them say that they are doing well.
Kline, '01, of Freeland, recently con-
ducted his first murder case, and succeeded
in having his client acquitted. He con-
ducted his case Nith skill and confidence,
and was warmly congratulated at the ter-
mination of the suit by the older members
of the bar.
THE FORUM
SCHOOL NOTES.
It has been suggested that the Allison
and Dickinson Societies conduct an inter-
society debate this year. Of this sugges-
tion we earnestly approve. Recently there
has been a tendency, in both societies, to
subordinate debating for exercises of a
more amusing, but less instructive, charac-
ter than debates. As a result, the mem-
bers are not obtaining the advantages for
which the societies were organized, and
the interest in the societies' work is begin-
ning to wane. An, inter-society debate
will revive and maintain this interest until
the end of the school year. There are ex-
cellent debaters in both societies, and an
interesting debate could be arranged.
Kauffman, of theSenior class, is writing
a book, entitled "Causes for Trouble, or
the Pedigree of a Child." It will be ready
for press about the first of next January,
and should have a large sale. The book
treats of the social conditions existing in
this country and Europe to-day. The
author has made a special study of these
conditions, and writes and talks interest-
ingly about them. Untilrecently, he was
an officiating rabbi in the orthodox Jewish
Church. Being educated in Europe, and
residing in this country for several years,
his work should contain interesting read-
ing.
The Senior class has elected the follow-
ing officers:
President-Walter P. Bishop.
Vice-President-W. N. Cooper.
Secretary-J. S. Peightel.
Treasurer-Charles Hickernell.
Historian-Fred. B. Gerber.
From 6,776 students registered in the
Law Schools in 1892, the number has in-
creased until at present there are over
14,500 students enrolled in the different
Law Schools.
Ed Rogers, who captained the Indian
foot ball team in 1901, and who was a
member of the present Senior class in its
Junior year, is continuing his law studies
at the University of Minnesota. He is a
member of the foot ball team of that insti-
tution and reports from there say he is
playing a fast game.
Law students will probably be iiterested
in knowing the attendance at the ten
largest Law Schools in the United States.
The following was the attendance for 1901-
1902:
University of Michigan Law School .... 854
New York Law School ........................ 811
Harvard Law School ........................... 632
New York University Law School .... .611
Columbian University Law School ...... 515
University of Minnesota Law School .. 504
Columbia University Law School ........ 439
University of Pennsylvania Law
School ............................................. 375
Boston University Law School ............ 834
Georgetown University Law School....288
Keelor, who was injured in the students'
celebration of Dickinson's defeat of An-
napolis on the gridiron, Oct. 25th, has re-
sumied his studies after an absence of
three weeks. He was in the hospital the
greater part of the time. His leg was so
badly injured that he has abandoned his
intention of participating in track events
this year. This will be regretted, for he
was one of the fastest men on the team.
Cannon, a member of the present Senior
class, who did not return this year, was in
town to witness the State-Dickinson
game. He is coaching a foot ball team in
Hazelton, his home, and is pursuing his
studies in a law office there.
Edward Gerber, a student at State Col-
lege, was a guest of his brother Fred,
Senior Law, a few days subsequent to the
game between his college and Dickinson.
Carlin, of the Middle class, has been ap-
pointed captain of the college base ball
team. This will be his second year on the
team. Last year he played centre field,
and occasionally pitched.
Heller, of the Junior class, who was
elected assistant manager of the base ball
team last spring while he was a student
in the college, has resigned. His entering
the Law School made it impossible for him
to further act as assistant manager.
Mr. and Mrs. A. V. Dively, of Altoona,
were visiting their son Ed. of the Middle
class, for several days during the past
month.
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BOOK REVIEW.
A:SBoTT's TRIAL BRIEF.-A brief for
trial of criminal cases. By Austin Abbott,
assisted by Wm. C. Beecher, late Assistant
District Attorney of New York. Second
and enlarged edition. Lawyers' Co-oper-
alive Publishing Co., Rochester, NY. Y., 1902.
This edition has been enlarged by the
publisher's editorial staff. It is about
twice the size of the first edition and its
eitations are thorqugh and brought down
to date. The work is so conveniently ar-
ranged that a casual glance will enable
one to trace the trial of a criminal case
step by step. To one engaged in criminal
practice, it is an invaluable work. The
arrangement of its chapters, the thorough-
ness of its citations, and the clearness ofits
ptyle, should make It as popular as the
original edition.
With Vol. V of their Cyclopedia of Law
and Procedgre, The American Law Book
Company present to the consideration of
the legal profession an innovation in law
book making which cannot but appeal
forcibly to every lawyer. The innovation
referred to consists in a small volume of
annotations bringing down to date the
articles published in the first four volumes
of the work.
The importance to the profession of this
event can hardly be exaggerated, for it
means relief in a large measure from the
awful drudgery of finding the law, and
moreoverinsures a law book which, instead
of depreciating, will actually increase in
value year by year.
MOOT COURT.
COMmONWEALTH OF PENNSYL-
VANIA vs. ADAMS.
Larceny of growing crops-Severance and
removal by continuous act not larceny-
Quashing indictment
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Defendant is indicted, charged with the
larceny of two bushels of potatoes. The
facts are, that on the evening of October
1, 1902, Adams entered the field of the
prosecutor, Tod, and unearthed the pota-
toes which were still in their natural state,
placed the same in a bag and made off.
Counsel for the prisoner moves the court
that the indictment be quashed.
HUBLER and JAMES for the prisoner.
Things pertaining to realty can be sub-
ject of larceny only when severance and
asportation are not one continuous act.
Com. v. Steimling, 156 Pa. 400; People v.
Williams, 35 Cal. 671 ; Ogden v. Riley, 14
N. J. L. 186; People v. Loomis, 4 Den.
(N. Y.) 380.
As to what constitutes a continuous act;
see,-Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, Vol. 18,
519; Bishop Cr. Law,Vol. 1, see. 782, note 5.
KNAPPENBERGER and JACOBS for the
Commonwealth.
Emblements and fructus industriales, at
common law, are treated as chattels
though still annexed. 4 Kent's Corn. 73 ;
Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, Vol. 9, Crops.
Digging, picking and carrying away of
potatoes is not one continuous act, but is
larceny. Com. v. Steimling, 156 Pa. 400 ;
Whart. Cr. Law. 8th ed., sec. 864; Bishop
Cr. Law, 4th ed., sec. 781.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
This is an indictment for the larceny of
growing potatoes. Defendant moves to
have the indictment quashed, contending
that the potatoes were realty, and that, in
this state, there can be no larceny of things
real. At common law things personal,
only, could be the subjects of larceny. 2
Bishop on Criminal Law, 780. Here those
things which are the subjects of larceny
are discussed at length, and a very fine
distinction, as to when an act constitutes
larceny and when it is only a trespass, is
drawn.
In I Hales P. C. 510, we find this state-
ment: "Larceny cannot be committed of
things that adhere to the freehold, as
trees, grass, bushes, hedges, stones or lead
of a house, or the like, but, if they are sev-
ered from the freehold, as wood cut, grass
in cocks, or stones dug out of a quarry,
then felony may be committed by stealing
them, for then they are personal estate."
Thus we find that potatoes growing in the
ground were, at common law and in the
early English decisions, considered as
realty, and consequently were not the sub-
jects of larceny.
We have thoroughly examined the deci-
sions in Pennsylvania on this subject, and
have found the rule to be nearly the same.
In Buttinger v. Baker, 29 Pa. 66, it was
held that "growing crops before maturity,
and unsevered from the soil, are part and
parcel of the land on which they grow."
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See also Long v. Seavers, 103 Pa. 517, and
Bear v. Betger, 16 Pa. 175. In examining
the authorities and decisions on the sub-
ject as to when an act is larceny and when
trespass, we find that if the potatoes had
been unearthed, and the defendant had
then carried them away, then the act, all
the other elements being present, would
have been larceny, as the potatoes would
have then been personalty; but in the case
at bar, the potatoes are growing, and de-
fendant goes upon prosecutor's land and
unearths them. Whether this was larceny
or trespass depends still further whether
the unearthing and the carrying away
was one continuous act or not. So far as
we can glean from the statement of facts,
we are of opinion that the unearthing and
the carrying away was a continuous act,
therefore making the act one of trespass
and not one of larceny.
There is a statute in Pennsylvania.
namely, the Act of June 8, 1881 (P. & L.,
Vol. 1. col. 1262), relating to malicious mis-
chief to gardens, orchards, etc., under
which this defendant can be successfully
prosecuted and punished, and in accord-
ance with which this action should have
been brought.
Tile motion of the defendant to quash
the indictment is granted.
EBBERT, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
It does not appear whether the owner of
the potatoes was the owner in fee of the
land, or a mere tenant of it. If he was a
tenant, the potatoes were clearly person-
alty. As every reasonable intendment
should be made in favor of the defendant,
we shall assume that the potatoes were
planted by, and belonged to, the owner of
the fee; and that he was in possession both
of the soil and of them, at the time of the
alleged asportation.
Annual crops, even when put into the
ground by the owner of the land, are said
to be personalty. Contracts concerning
them are not within the statute of frauds.
They can, as personalty, be levied on by
the sheriff, and sold. On the death of the
owner, tile land passes in one direction
and the crops in another; the former to
the heirs, the latter to the administrator,
and through him to the next of kin, who
may be a different person from the heir.
Of. Hershey v. Metzgar, 90 Pa. 217.
It is also true that if the owner sells the
laud, without excepting the crops, he is
understood to sell them with it; and that
if the sheriff levies on and sells the land,
he also sells the crops as if a part of it.
The crops then have a somewhat am-
biguous position. For some purposes they
are personalty; for others, realty.
In the few cases. to which our attention
has been directed, in which the question
has been considered, they have been con-
sidered as realty, so far as their being the
subject of an alleged larceny at common
law was concerned. It has been held that
taking up potatoes, and carrying them
away, under circumstances that, were
the subject personalty, would make
the act larceny, is not larceny at
common law. Comfort v. Fulton,
39 Barb. 56; Bell v. State, 63 Tenn.
426. The same has been held of corn.
State v. Stevenson, 2 Bailey 334 [S. C.].
Says Blackstone, Vol. 4, p. 232: ", This
felonious taking and carrying away must
be of the personal goods of another; for, if
they are things real, or savor of the realty,
larceny at the common law cannot be com-
mitted of them. * * * * And of
things likewise that adhere to the free-
hold, as corn, grass, trees, and the like, *
* * * no larceny could be committed
by the rules of the common law."
Illogical as it may seem, having defined
larceny as "the felonious taking and car-
rying away of the personal goods of
another;" 4 Black. 230, and having classi-
fied annual crops as personalty, Hershey
v. Metzgar, 90 Pa. 217 ; Long v. Seavers,
103 Pa. 517; Backenstoes v. Stahler, 33 Pa.
251; to say that the taking and carrying
away of such crops are not larceny, we
agree with the learned court below that
they are not larceny.
Potatoes like trees, fixtures, ore, sand,
etc., can be separated from the earth, and
become true chattels, and, after they have
become such, they may be stolen. But the
act of separating them and taking them
away must not be continuous. The in-
dictment so defines the act of the defend-
ant, that the digging up, putting into a
bag and carrying off must be taken to have
been continuous. It was, therefore, at
common law, a trespass against the land,
not a larceny of personal property.
Judgment affirmed.
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RINK'S ESTATE.
.Pxceptions to Auditor's report-When a,
debt becomes a lien onpersonalty-How
lost-Distribution of personalty of de-
cedents-Act of February 24, 1834.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Holcomb sold a farm for $4,200 to Rink.
He took a judgment for $2,000 of the pur-
chase money, and notes for another $1,000.
The rest was paid in cash. When the
judgment became payable, Holcomb is-
sued execution and sold the farm for $1,600,
the buildings having been destroyed by
fire. Shortly after the issue and before
return of the ft. fa., Rink died. The ad-
ministrator's personal estate amounted to
$900. The fund was claimed by Holcomb
and by Hetrick, who had lent $600 to Rink.
The auditor directed division of the fund
pro rata between them. Both Holcomb
and Hetrick except, each claiming all.
GERBER and WILLIAMSON for Hetrick.
The lien of judgments binds real estate
only. Trickett on Liens, Vol. 1, page 221.
Judgment creditors' rights over personalty
only become superior to simple contract
debtors upon issuance of aft.fa., and levy
before next return day. Person's Appeal,
78 Pa. 145.
SCHANZ and MYERS for Holcomb.
A valid lien of execution is not destroyed
by the death of the defendant. Connell
v. O'Neil, 154 Pa. 582.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The plaintiffs in this case contend that
Holcomb is entitled to the sum of $400 in
full payment of the balance due him on
the judgment for $2,000. The defendants
maintain that the decree of the auditor in
awarding the fund to be distributed pro
rata between the exceptants was proper
and without error. The main question in
this case seems to be whether theft, fa. on
the personalty retains its lien, in which
case the judgment for the remaining $400
will be paid first; or if it does not retain
its lien, then the fund realized from the
sale of the personalty will be distributed
according to the rule established for the
distribution of decedents' estates.
In Person's Appeal, 78 Pa. 145, it was
held that rights over personalty only be-
come superior to simple contract debtors
upon the issuance of aft. fa. and levy be-
fore the next return day, in which case
they have a lien from the time the writ
reaches the hands of the sheriff. The
statement of facts, however, does not war-
rant us in saying that the goods were levied
on before the death of the decedent.
In Mason's Appeal, 89 Pa. 402, it was
held that the proper method of distribut-
ing insolvent decedents' estates is to divide
the personal assets pro rata among all
debtors regardless of quality, then to satisfy
the balance of the debts, which are liens
upon the realty, out of the proceeds de-
rived from the sale of realty, in otder of
their priority. After this, if a balance re-
mains, it should be divided pro rata
among all unpaid debts. This case seems
to be closely related to the one at bar.
The court is of the opinion that since the
lien of theft. fa. on the personalty is not
upheld, because the levy is not a certainty,
the fund of $900 must be distributed ac-
cording to the provisions of the Act of
Feb. 24, 1834; and since neither of these
claims is a preferred debt, the proceeds
realized from the sale of the personalty
must be distributed pro rata. The report
of the auditor is affirmed.
JONES, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The learned court below properly con-
eluded that there was no right of preced-
ence in Holcomb. He issued aft.fa. be-
fore the death of Rink, which occurred be-
fore the return of the writ. What the
nature of the personalty was, is not dis-
closed. It may have been debts due Rink
or moneys in his hands, on which a f. fa.
could not be levied, or could not become a
lien. The return day may have passed be-
fore alevy was made, whereby the lien prev-
iously gained, was relaxed. If Holcomb
has no lien on the personalty, he would be
entitled simply to share ratably with Het-
rick.
Holcomb's debt arose from his sale of a
farm. The price of it was $4,200. Of this
amount twelve hundred dollars were paid
in cash. Notes for $1,000 were taken. A
judgment for $2,000 was confessed. The
buildings having been destroyed by fire,
the value of the farm was so far diminished
that it sold, on execution, for but $1,600.
There remained unpaid of the purchase
money, over $400. Was this a debt, for
payment of which resort could be had to
the personal or other estate of Rink?
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Had there been no conveyance of the
land, Holcomb's sale on the judgment
would be regarded as extinguishing the
contract and also Rink's debt. Love v.
Jones, 4 W. 465; Purviance v. Lemmon, 16
S. & R. 292; Pittsburg etc. R. R. Co. v.
Jones, 59 Pa. 433. We think, however,
though the fact is not explicitly stated,
that it is to be taken as granted, that the
conveyance was made. The whole of the
purchase money was paid or secured by
notes or a judgment. The legal estate, as
well as the equitable, thereupon passed to
Rink. In such a case, the sale of it in ex-
ecution for the unpaid purchase money
does not rescind the contract, and preclude
a resort to the debtor's other property for
the residue of the purchase money. Wolfe's
Appeal, 110 Pa. 126.
Appeal dismissed.
CHAS. BLANKENBURG vs. FRED.
HILL.
Miing-1.ights of subjacent support-
Statute of limitation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Hill owned coal over which was land of
plaintiff, on which was a residence, an
orchard, etc. Hill's predecessor in owner-
ship had, in 1891, removed all coal under
plaintiff's land. He conveyed his mine
to the defendant in April, 1892, and Hill
then, in 1894, continued the mining under
the tracts adjacent to the plaintiff. The
result was that the plaintiff's surface caved
in and his house and orchard were de-
stroyed in the spring of 1897. He brought
this action of trespass in 1898. He seeks
as damages the loss on account of the de-
struction of his house and orchard, etc.
The court was asked to charge: (a)
Statute of limitations as a bar. (b) Dam-
ages are the difference between the market
value of the premises before and after the
cave in.
KEELoR and WnIGHT for the plaintiff.
There is no cause of action unless the
miner left no pillars, or too few of them.
Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474. A cause
of action arises from failure to afford the
surface sufficient support when the coal
has been removed. Lunny v. Coal Co.,
166 Pa. 536; McGettigan v. Potts, 149 Pa.
159. Statute of limitation begins to run
from time of the discovery of the injury.
Lewly v. Frick Coke Co., 166 Pa. 556.
DRUMHELLBR and DELANEY for the
defendant.
The measure of damages is the diminu-
tion in the market value of the property
from the time mining began. Rockland
Kaler Co. v. Tillson, 69 Me. 269; Sedgwick
on Damages (8th ed.), see. 932; Herbert v.
Rainy, 162 Pa. 525; McGettigan v. Potts,
149 Pa. 155.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Plaintiff brings this action to recover for
injury to his property, caused by the "cav-
ing in" of the surface of his land. The
"cave in" was caused by the mining of
coal by defendant, or his predecessors in
ownership.
The coal immediately under plaintiff's
land was mined by defendant's grantee in
1891. The defendant, after acquiring pos-
session in 1894, continued the mining un-
der the land adjacent to plaintiff's. The
"cave in" occurred in 1897, and plaintiff
commenced this action in 1898, more than
six years after the mining under plaintiff's
land. The first question, therefore, is:
What was the date of the cause of action?
A cause of action is that which produces
or effects the results complained of.
Where there has been a horizontal divi-
sion of land, the owner of the subjacent
estate, coal or other mineral, owes to the
superincumbent owner a right of support.
This is an absolute right, arising out of the
ownership of the surface. Therefore, the
right of action arose when the mine op-
erator failed to provide sufficient support.
That was more than six years before the
suit was brought.
The date of the "cave in," and destruc-
tion of the house and orchard, was not the
date of the cause of action. That was only
the consequence of a previous cause. Since
the surface owner had a right to subjacent
support, he had the right to enter the
mine, and see that his right was being
maintained by the person mining the coal
under the land. This he did not do, and
he cannot now, after the expiration of six
years, maintain this action. In no case,
however, would defendant be responsible
for the acts of his predecessors.
Judgment for defendant.
CANNON, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
What was the duty which Hill violated?
Was it to keep under the surface of Blank-
enburg's land a sufficient support ? Or
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was it the duty not to cause the cave in of
the land, in consequence of the want of
support? If the latter, the breach occurred
in less than six years before the inception
of the suit; if the former, the cause of ac-
tion was more than six years old. The
House of Lords, highest appellate court in
Great Britain, has adopted the latter view.
Bonomi v. Backhouse, 96 Eng. C. L 642.
The former view is taken by the Supreme
Court of this State, in Noonan v. Pardee,
200 Pa. 474. In that case, the wrong is said
to consist, not in producing the effect, but
in bringing into existence the initial link
in a chain of causes. Though the removal
of the coal support occurs to-day, the con-
currence of other causes through a period
of ten or twenty years may be needed to
disturb the surface. The cause of action
is, nevertheless, the removal of the coal,
not the effect more or less remotely ensu-
ing.
Many duties are not to refrain from
acts, but to refrain from their conse-
quences. There is no duty, e. g., to be
careful. The only duty is, to avoid hurt
to another as a consequence of carelessness.
Aman driving acarriage recklesslythrough
the street has violated no duty towards a
pedestrian He first violates a duty when
he runs into the pedestrian. His want of
care would support no action, unless it had
caused hurt.
There are many acts which are tortious,
because they produce or tend to produce
harm. They are actionable before the
harm has been produced. For libel or
slander, a new cause of action does not
come into existence with every successive
detrimental impression made by it. The
suit must be brought in a period measured
from the publication.
Judgment affirmed.
SAMUEL JACOBS vs. THE BANK.
Depositor's duty to bank-Altered checks
-Bank relieved by negligence of de-
Positor.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Jacobs was a depositor in the bank. He
drew a check for $200. His clerk, with
acid, erased the word "hundred," insert-
ing in the same place the word "thou-
sand," and adding a cipher to the figures
200. The bank paid the check which was
presented by one to whom the clerk handed
it. Two months afterwards, Jacobs' bank
book was balanced and his checks re-
turned. He asked the clerk to verify, who
reported that all was right. Four months
after this, Jacobs discovered the forgery,
and demanded the $2,000 from the bank.
In the meantime, the clerk who had been
speculating failed, and fled to parts un-
known. Had the bank been informed of
the fraud at any time prior to one month
before the clerk's departure it might, by
action or threatened prosecution, have re-
covered the money from the clerk. In the
action for the $2,000, the court said to the
jury that the evidence disclosed no de-
fence. Appeal.
WALSHr and VASTINE for the plaintiff.
A bank paying a forged or an altered
check is liable to depositor for full amount,
if forged, and to raised amount, if altered.
Weisse v. Dennison, 10N. Y. 68; Welsh v.
German American Bank, 73 N. Y. 126.
A depositor, on return of his paid checks,
is not bound to examine them to see that
they are correct. United Security Co. v.
The Bank, 185 Pa. 586.
Notice to agent is not notice to princi-
pal, if agent has a personal interest which
would lead him to conceal it. Barnes v.
Trenton Gas Co., 27 N. J. E. ; Gunster v.
Scranton Power Co., 181 Pa. 327; Allen v.
Boston R. R. Co., 150 Mass. 200.
DRUMHELLER and EBBERT for the de-
fendant.
Failure of depositor to examine and ac-
cept or reject checks prevents his disput-
ing the bank's credits. Leather Manu-
facturing Co. v. Morgan, 117 U. S. 96;
United Security Co. v. Nat. Bank, 185 Pa.
586; Myres v. Bank, 193 Pa. 1.
Having delegated authority to an agent,
depositor is responsible for his omission or
commission. Gunster v. Scranton Power
Co., 181 Pa. 327; Myres v. Bank, supra.
Bank is not bound to know writing in
body of check. Leather Manufacturing
Co. v. Morgan, supra; Dana v. Bank, 132
Mass. 156.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
In their relations with depositors, banks
are held, as they ought to be, to rigid re-
sponsibilities. But the principles govern-
ing those relations ought not to be so ex-
tended as to invite or encourage such
negligence by the depositors in the exam-
ination of their bank accounts as is incon-
sistent with the relation of the parties, or
with those established rules and usages,
sanctioned by business men of ordinary
prudence and sagacity, which are, or
ought to be, known to depositors.
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In the case under consideration there is
a loss which must fall either upon the
bank or upon its depositor, Jacobs. This
is unfortunate, for it appears that each
was attempting to deal fairly with the
other.
If the loss is to fall upon the depositor,
it will be either becausehe is bound by the
acts of his agent, or on account of his failure
to notify the bank of the agent's altering
the check, from which failure the bank has
lost a complete remedy. If the bank is
liable, it can be upon the only ground,
that it has authority to pay out its deposi-
tor's money only under the depositor's di-
rection, and that this was paid out not at
the direction of its depositor.
The theory, that notice to the agent is
notice to the principal, is not sustained in
case of such conduct by the agent as raises
a question of clear presumption, that he
would not communicate the fact in con-
troversy, as where the agent acts for him-
self, in his own interest, and adversely to
that of the principal. A fraud committed
by an agent on his own account is beyond
the scope of his authority, and bears an
analogy to a tort willfully committed by a
servant for his own purpose, and not a
means of performing the business en-
trusted to him by his master. Gunster v.
Scranton Power Co., 181 Pa. 327; Allen v.
South Boston R. R. Co., 150 Mass. 200.
This case falls within the above rule.
In Myres v. The Bank, 193 Pa. 1, which
followed Bank v. Morgan, 117 U. S. 96, it
would seem that the principal, in cases of
this kind, should be bound by the act of
the agent. That was a case of forgery,
which covered a period of two and a half
years. The loss fell upon the depositor,
because if he had examined his bank book
and compared check stubs, the forgery
would have been discovered, and thus pre-
vented the bank's paying out money on
subsequently forged checks. "No objec-
tion having been made at first settlement,
the bank had the right to assume that
everything was correct." In the case at
bar, no payments were made after the first
mispayment. The bank did not act in
any way upon the failure of Jacobs to no-
tify it that the checks had been altered.
It is also to be observed that the signa-
ture is the essential part of a check, and
the bank is not bound to pay any attention
to the handwriting of the other parts, un-
less it shows something to excite suspicion.
United Security Co. v. Bank, 185 Pa. 586.
"To require a bank in most cases to know
by whom the body of a check was written
would be to require an impossibility. Such
a rule would not only be arbitrary and rig-
orous, but unjust. National Bank of Com-
merce v. Banking Association, 55 N. Y.
211.
The parties are both innocent. But from
a perusal of the cases bearing upon this
case, it seems that a bank has authority to
pay out its depositor's money only upon
his check. When a bank pays a check
which is presented, it must, at its peril,
ascertain whether such check is genuine.
Should it not be genuine, it will entitle.
the bank to no credit against the depos-
itor's account. "Had Jacobs notified the
bank one month before the clerk's de-
parture, it might, by action or threatened
prosecution, have recovered the money."
The courts will not go into speculative
questions as to what might or might not
have been the result from an earlier dis-
covery of the fraud. Bank v. Bank, 159
Pa. 46. At time of mispayment, the bank
was liable to Jacobs, and we fail to dis-
cover anything that has cancelled their
debt to him, though his laches are not to
be commended.
Judgment affirmed.
SHERBINE, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The bank is bound to honor the checks
of its depositor. It has no right to pay out
his funds, on a check which he has not
made nor authorized, and, in respect to
whose execution or alteration, he has not
been negligent. Jacobs drew the $200
check. It was genuine. His clerk altered
it. It does notappearthatany negligence
of Jacobs promoted the success of the al-
teration. It was not negligent to employ
a clerk, who has, in fact, committed a
fraud. It was not negligent to use an ink
which could be removed by an acid. The
act of the clerk cannot be imputed on any
apparent ground, to Jacobs, his employer.
When, then, the bank paid the clerk's
deputy $2,000, it paid $1,800 more than it
was authorized to pay. The payment of
the $200 was in accordance with Jacobs'
direction, and, it seems, for his benefit.
The bank, therefore, is, were there nothing
more in the case, liable to pay the plain-
tiff, not $2,000, but $1,800.
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The bank balanced the book of its de-
positor, and returned to him the checks
for paying which it claimed credit.. He
should, as a prudent man, promptly have
examined them, and decided upon the
correctness of the credits claimed. Myers
v. Bank, 193 Pa. 1; Critten v. Chemical
Nat. Bank, 171 N. Y. 219 Nay, he owed
a duty to the bank either thus to examine
and disavow checks found not genuine, or
to acquiesce in the bank's act, should his
disavowal put a loss on it which his
promptness would have prevented. If, e.
g., the bank is, by his seeming assent to
the accuracy of checks, induced to honor
others having the same defects, he will
preclude himself from denying the pro-
prietk' of its act of so honoring them. 193
Pa. 1.
It does not appear that any other altered
checks were paid by the bank in conse-
quence of Jacobs' apparent assent to the
soundness of the one in question. It does
appear, however, that, had the bank been
informed of the clerk's forgery a month
prior to his flight, it might have recovered
the money paid on the cheek from him.
We are to presume that it would have
taken the steps needful to secure itself,
and, had it done so, they would have led
to success. It follows, we think, that
Jacobs is responsible for the loss which his
prevailing in the present action will hm-
pose on the bank if he ought to have dis-
covered the fraud betimes, and given no-
tice of it to the bank. 171 N. Y. 219. He
alleges that in committing the examina-
tion of his bank book and ot the checks to
the forging clerk he did all that it was in-
cumbent on him to do. We think not
The bank is not responsible for the mis-
conduct of the clerk, in falsely reporting to
Jacobs that the credits claimed by the
bank in the book were "right." For his
own convenience Jacobs deputed this work
to another instead of doing it himself.
He cannot thus change his duties towards
the bank. He takes the risk, not the
bank, when he employs a clerk for this
purpose. Myers v. Bank, 193 Pa. 1; Crit-
ten v. Bank, 171 N. Y. 219.
Thejury might have found, from the
evidence, that had Jacobs given the notice
to the bank one month prior to the escape of
the clerk, the bank could have, and would
have made itself whole. Had itso found,
it would follow that the loss which was in
the first instance upon it, was transferred
to the plaintiff.
It is to be observed that we predicate
this conclusion on the absence of negli-
gence on the part of the bank. Whether,
had it negligently paid the check, it could
take advantage of the subsequent non-
negligent failure of Jacobs to notify it of
the forgery, we refrain from considering.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
TID vs. SEMPLE.
Fraud-Partnership-Deceit of one part-
ner-Liability of one partner to another
for deceit.
STATEIENT OF THE CASE.
On January 1st, Semple and Tid formed
a partnership to engage in the grocery
business, each placing in the concern $2,000.
Tid supposed that Semple was perfectly
solvent, and would never have entered
into the business had not Semple assured
him repeatedly during the consummation
of the partnership that "he could hold up
his end of the string." Two months later
Semple made an assignment with the re-
sult that Tid, being solvent, had the firm
debts to pay, the firm assets not being suf-
ficient. As a matter of fact Semple was
insolvent at the time of the forming of the
partnership. Tid now brings an action
against Semple for fraud.
PRICK= and WILCOX for plaintiff.
The fraud of one partner dissolves the
partnership, and the innocent party has a
right of action against his guilty partner.
Defendant's statement of his responsibility
was at least recklessly made, and has the
same effect as if defendant had knowledge
of its falsity. Defendant was bound to
know his own financial condition. 122
Mass. 132; 71 N. Y. 594; 6 Pa. 31; 1 Yates
528; 2 Pa. 376.
WILLIS and SHoMo for defendant.
Defendant's statement was a mere ex-
pression of opinion. To support an action
in deceit, plaintiff must show: (1) That
the representation was untrue, (2) that de-
fendant knew it was untrue, (3) that it was
made to induce defendant to act, (4) that
defendant did act upon it to his damage.
100 Pa. 249; 23 Pa. 178; 31 Pa. 324; 149
Mass. 188; 146 Mass. 86.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Tid entered into a partnership under
the influence of the belief that Semple, his
partner, was solvent. Semple was in fact
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insolvent. From these facts, alone, springs
no right of action.
From the fact that Semple was insolvent
may the jury find that he knew it? We
have no information as to the degree or
the occasion of his insolvency. It might
have been so gross, and have lasted so long.
that his ignorance of it would be very im-
probable. Cincinnati Cooperage Co. v.
Gaul, 170 Pa. 545. But, it might also be
slight. It might have been occasioned by
an unexpected, and as yet, undetected loss
of value of his assets. We do not think
that the jury should be allowed to infer
Semple's knowledge of it, from the insol-
vency merely.
But, even if Semple knew it, would his
entering into the relation of partner with
Tid, be a fraud? He was not unable to
pay the contribution he agreed to pay. He
paid the $2,000. What reason had he to
anticipate that the firm itself would become
insolvent, so that resort to the individual
liability of the partners would become
necessary? His individual insolvency had
no agency in rendering the firm insolvent.
Though one is insolvent, he often is able
financially to recuperate. Knowledge of
his present insolvency was not equivalent
to knowledge that at some future time the
firm having grown insolvent and its credi-
tos recurring to t.he partners, he would be
unable to meet his share of the debts. It
has been held in Pennsylvania that to
purchase goods, knowing that one is in-
solvent, is not ipsofacto, a fraud. Smith v.
Smith, 21 Pa. 367; Backenstoes v. Specher,
31 Pa. 324; Cf. Rodman v. Thalheimer, 75
Pa. 232; Wessels v. Weiss, 156 Pa. 591. We
do not think that entering into any other
kind of a contract, involving an assump-
tion of liability, is a fraud, merely because
the party is, and knows that he is, in-
solvent.
But, it appears that Semple repeatedly
assured Tid that "he could hold up his end
of the string," and the jury might possibly
find that by these words, he intended Tid
to understand that he, Semple, was ex-
pressing the belief that he would be able to
meet all the liabilities growing out of the
partnership transactions. The words ex-
press opinion concerning a future fact.
We think there is no fraud in them, if'the
opinion really existed.
What is there to show that this opinion
did not exist? Unless we know more of
the size of the deficiency of Semple's
assets, with respect to his liabilities, and
how and when it became apparent, we are
not justified in affirming that the declara-
tion of opinion was untrue. Though in-
solvent in fact he may have believed what
he said. He may have been ignorant,
when he ought to have known, or he may
have judged his future financial ability
with foolish optimism, but the law does
not make him liable for these traits. If
two months later his liabilities greatly ex-
ceeded his assets, an inference might be
drawn that he was aware of his insolvency
when the firm was entered into, and also
that he could not believe and therefore
did not believe, that he could hold up his
end of the string. In the evidence educed,
we find no support for a verdict implying
that conclusion.
Plaintiff non-suit.
STOKES vs. HAINES.
Instrument under seal-Subscribing wit-
nesses- When. their testimony may be dis-
pensed with.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Stokes alleging that he was owner of a
house that Haines had entered and de-
stroyed by fire, brought an action of tres-
pass.
The house had been erected on leased
land by Stokes, and he had theright of re-
moving it. Haines alleged that Stokes
sold it by bill of sale to one Coleman prior
to the alleged trespass.
A bill of sale purport was offered, hav-
ing two subscribing witnesses. Defendant
not calling these witnesses nor explaining
why he did not, offered to call himself and
Stokes; himself to prove the execution.
The court excluded the witnesses.
Judgment was granted in favor of
Stokes.
KAUFFmAN for the plaintiff.
Bill of sale is not foundation of action,
hence provable by any competent evidence.
Kitchen v. Smith, 101 Pa. 452; Schanber-
ger v. Hackman, 37 La. 92; Gallagher v.
Cnrporation, 149 Ore. 25.
JONES and KELOI for the defendant.
Subscribing witnesses must be called to
prove execution of sealed instruments.
Hautz v. Rough, 2 S. & R, 349; Hay v.
THE FORUM
Kramer, 2 W. & S. 138; Brobst v. Wilker,
8 Pa. 467; 1 Greenleafon Evidence, Sec: 569:
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Does an admission by the maker of an
instrument under seal, witnessed by sub-
scribing witnesses, dispense with the rule
which requires the calling of the subscrib-
ing witnesses to prove execution of the
same?
Lord Ellenborough, 0. J., expressed the
sentiments of the English courts when he
said, in Kray v. Inhabitants, 4 M. & S.
353, decided in 1815, "But if any general
rule is to prevail, this (referring to the ne-
cessity of calling thesubscribing witnesses)
is certainly one that is as fixed, formal
and universal, as any thatcan be stated in
a court of justice," again, "If there ever
was a case in which the rule might reason-
ably have been relaxed, It was surely the
case of Abbott v. Plumber, yet in that
case the court held the rule to be inexor-
able."
The American courts, generally, have
closely adhered to this doctrine, departing
from it only in a few exceptional cases in
which the inconvenience caused by requir-
ing the subscribing witnesses, the nature
of the instrument witnessed, and the im-
probability of injury resulting to the de-
clarant justified the relaxation.
The New York courts were among the
first to recognize an exception to the rule.
In Hall v. Phelps, 2 Johnson 45, decided
in 1807, they held, in an action on a prom-
issory note witnessed by two subscribing
witnesses, that proof of an admission by
the payor was sufficient proof of execution.
The court argued that the confession was
high proof, highly convenient and produc-
tiveofnoinjury. The question again came
before the same court one year later. It
was a suit on a bond to which the defen-
dant pleaded non estfactum. Evidence of
an admission by the defendant, a short
time before the institution of the suit, that
the bond was duly executed was excluded
on the ground that the subscribing wit-
nesses were not called. ChiefJustice Kent
delivered the opinion of the court sustain-
ing the lower court and proceeded in part:
"The case of Hall v. Phelps has been
thought to have decided this question. I
do not consider it in that light. That case
arose upon a promissory note and this upon
a deed. The rules of evidence may be more
safely relaxed in.the one case than in the
other. * * A deed is an act
of much higher force and solemnity in
the law. * * I concurred in
that decision from a sense of the
great inconvenience of the English rule,
which applied to commercial paper, which
circulates with great facility and credit
without the encumbrance of a subscribing
witness, and because I did not recollect a
case in which the application of the rule
requiring the subscribing witness, did not
arise upon a specialty. We are not, there-
fore, at liberty to extend that decision to
deeds, and consequently, to all assurances
of real property." Fox v. Reil, 3 Johnson
476.
To the same extend the Pennsylvania
authorities have departed from the Eng-
lish rule. In Truby v. Byers, 6 Pa. 347,
it was held that the subscribing witnesses
to a deed must be called before execution
can be proved by secondary evidence.
Seeako Brobst v. Welker, 8 Pa. 467. The
action of the trial court in admitting sec-
ondary evidence to prove the execution of
a promissory note was affirmed in Williams
v. Floyd, 11 Pa. 499.
The case at bar, however, is to be distin-
guished from Fox v. Reil in that the ad-
mission which thedefendant sought to elicit
from the plaintiff would have been made,
if at all, in open court. Such an admission,
which is known as asolemn or judicial ad-
mission, is in fact no evidence, but a sub-
stitute for evidence. It dispenses with the
need of evidence. It would be an act of
folly for the plaintiff, at the call of the de-
fendant, to voluntarily admit in the pres-
ence of the court and jury that he executed
the bill of sale and then attempt to prove
the contrary.
The Supreme Court of Michigan has
taken a like view of a similar case in which
Judge Campbell said: "It may be very
proper to allow a party to decline calling
his adversary, and to insist that this wit-
ness (subscribing) shall, if practical, be pro-
duced. But where one party is willing to
call the other, the latter can usually have
no reason to complain, and we think that
to this extent the reasoh of the rule has
very little force to prevent it, and should
not preclude such proof."
We believe, therefore, the plaintiff was
a competent witness.
On another principal his as well as the
defendant's proposed testimony was com-
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petent. The question directly in issue was
whether the defendant entered and de-
stroyed by fire the plaintiffs house. The
title of the plaintiff as well as the commis-
sion of the tortious acts were the only ques-
tions directly in issue. The bill of sale was
merely a means empleyed by the defen-
dant to disprove the plaintiff's claim of
title in himself, which was essential to his
right of recovery. When the execution of
an instrument is a collateral issue it may
be proved by any competent evidence, not-
withstanding the fact that it purports to
have been witnessed by subscribing wit-
nesses. Heckert v. Haine, 6 Binn. 16;
Mix. v. Smith, 7 Pa. 75; Wright v. Wood,
23 Pa. 120; and Kitchen v. Smith, 101 Pa.
452.
Judgement reversed and a v. f. d. n,
awarded.
FRED B. GERBER, J.
PILLER vs. SALLADY.
Mercantile agencies-Fraud in procuring
rating-Duty to furnish true representa-
tions of assets and liabilities-Right of
subscribers to rely on such statements.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Sallady, a merchant, for the purpose of
procuring a rating by Dunn & Co., a mer-
cantile agency, delivered to it a statement
of assets and liabilities, showing the assets
to be three pieces of land worth $100,000,
and personalty worth $50,000, and his lia-
bilities to be worth $78,000. Dunn & Co.
did not rely solely on this statement, but
on information from other sources in giv-
ing to Sallady his rating, viz, as worth
$200,000. This rating was, as was their
custom, sent to all merchants desiring to
deal with Sallady, and among them Piller,
who depending on it, sold $2800 of goods
to Sallady.
This sale occurred three months after
Sallady's statement to Dunn & Co., during
which time he had sold all his land, rea-
lizing in all $50,000 from it, applying it to
debts, and he had contracted an additional
$25,000 of debts.
Certain creditors levied an execution on
Sallady's property and sold it. This was
trespass for his fraud. Piller relied on Dunn
& Co. and swore that he would have made
the sale, had it been as of only $125,000.
AmERMAN and JACOBS for plaintiff.
A subscriber is not always, and under all
circumstances bound to keep furnishing to
the agency from day to day the exact con-
dition of his finances. Ralph v. Fonder-
smith, 10 Sup. C. 481; Cortland Mfg. Co.
v. Platt, 83 Mich. 419.
The truth or falsity of a representation
is to be ascertained by the jury, atthe time
the representation was made. Corbett v.
Gilbert, 24 Ga. 454; Rure v. Dumett, 145
Mass. 23.
Houcm and LLOYD for defendant.
Fraud must be established by direct
proof, or by facts to warrant its existence.
McAleer v. McMurray, 58 Pa. 126; Bigelow
on Torts p. 53.
Where a party makes false statements of
his solvency believing them to be true, he
is not liable in an action of deceit, or if the
plaintiff did not rely on any representation
made, there can be no recovery. Dilworth
v. Bradner, 85 Pa. 238.
Persons acting upon the report of a com-
mercial agency, and being acquainted with
the statements upon which the report was
based, cannot maintain an action of deceit,
if the statements are false Poska v. Sterns,
42 L. R. A. 427.
.In relying upon statements made to a
commercial agency, due allowance must
be made for changes which may have taken
place. Achram v. Strouse, 28 S W. 262;
Curtis Brothers & Co. v. Hoxie, 88 Wis. 45.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The defendant in this case made certain
representations, as to his assets, to the Mer-
cantile Agency of Dunn & Co. Relying on
this statement and from information re-
ceived from other sources, he was given a
rating in excess of that fixed by himself.
It subsequently appeared that his assets
were considerably less than the amount
which he had stated. The plaintiff rely-
ing upon the rating of Dunn & Co., sold to
the defendant certain goods. Subsequent-
ly the sale of the property of the plaintiff
showed a large deficit, and this action was
brought to recover for the deceit which was
practiced upon him.
The representation made in this case and
alleged by the plaintiff to be false, was not
made directly to him, but to a mercantile
agency. This fact will not, however, re-
lieve from responsibility, if the evidence
otherwise be sufficient to sustain a verdict.
"A subscriber to a commercial agency has
a right to rely on the fairness and honesty
of the statement of the financial condition
made by the other subscribers. The record-
ing agency is the mutual agent of its sub-
scribers in securing and communicating in-
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formation, and the subscribers must, from
the very nature of the business, know that
the rating is a representation of financial
standing as of near the date of publication
of the record book, and the representation
thus made is intended to reach and influ-
ence persons, who are entitled to see the
book." Ralph v. Fondersmith, 10 Sup.
481, 487; Silberman v. Munroe, 104 Mich.
352; Eaton v. Avery, 83 N. Y. 31.
To sustain the action, it is not necessary
that the fraudulent statement be made at
the time of the sale. Fechheimer & Co. v.
Baum & Bro., 2 L. R. A. 153; Ralph v.
Fondersmith, supra.
Though the period elapsing must be rea-
sonable. Sharpless v. Gummey, 166 Pa.,
199.
But it is insisted that the statement re-
lied upon in this case was not the one made
by the defendant, but a compilation by
the agency from other sources, in conjunc-
tion with it. This in itself is not sufficient
to prevent a recovery. It is proper to sub-
mit to the jury the question whether the
false representations furnished one of the
causes, if not the sole inducing cause, which
led to the sale in question. Tindle v. Bis-
kett, 171 N. Y. 520; Morgan v. Skiddy, 62
N. Y. 316.
It was by reason of the failure of the
lower courts to distinguish in submitting
the case to the jury, between the question
as to whether the rating of the agency was
relied on, or the false statement of the de-
fendant which led to the reversal in Poska
v. Sterns, 42 L. R. A. 427.
But is there sufficient evidence in this
case to submit to the jury and justify them
in finding that the representation of Sal-
lady was an inducing cause? The state-
ment to Dunn & Co. showed assets of but
$72,000, whereas the plaintiff testifies that
he would have made the sale had he been
rated at $125,000. We do not see, therefore,
how he could have been led to make the
sale by the false representation of the de-
fendant. This determination renders un-
necessary the consideration of the submis-
sion to the jury of the falsity of the state-
ment made by the defendant. It may be
said, however, that if the evidence showed
a reliance upon Sallady's statement, we
would be bound to leave it to the jury to
say whether the defendant knew his state-
ment was false, or whether the circum-
stances showed a reckless assertion in con-
scious ignorance of fact. Griswold v.
Gebbie, 126 Pa. 353; Erie City Iron Works
v. Barber, 106 Pa. 142.
Though it is not for them to determine
when the quesion of falsity is submitted,
whether he had reasonable grounds for
forming the belief, if,. as a matter of fact,
they found it existed. Lamberton v. Dun-
bam, 165 Pa. 125; Dilworth v. Bradner, 85
Pa. 235.
It being apparent, therefore, that the
representation, even if false, could not have
been an inducing cause which lea the
plaintiff to part with his property, the
motion for a compulsory non-suit is
granted.
SMITH vs. JONES.
Company doctors-Contract between em-
ployer and employee-Suit by third
party-No recovery.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Samuel Jones, a railroad contractor, em-
ployed 500 men to perform certain work for
him. The men were to be paid by the day,
and 50 cents per month was to be held by
contractor from each laborer for medical
attendance.
Samuel Jones, the contractor, employed
a physician, Dr. Stone, at$75.00 per month,
to attend the laborers.
Some of the men, not wishing to have
Dr. Stone attend them, sought medical at-
tention from Dr. Smith to the amount of
$350.00.
Dr. Smith now sues contractor Jones to
recover the $350.00 for the attention ren-
dered during the several months.
DrvELY and HoucK for the plaintiff.
Money in hands of one for benefit of a
third party may be recovered by that third
party. Hind v. Holdship, 2 Watts 104;
Adams v. Kuehn, 119 Pa. 76.
Whether the party is specifically named
or not, where he may afterwards be deter-
mined. Keim v. Taylor, 11 Pa. 163; Bin-
ner v. Weeks, 159 Pa. 504.
The employer was the trustee of a fund
the equitable title of which was in the em-
ployees. Adams v. Kuehn, 119 Pa. 76;
Bouvier's Law Diet. 1146; Black's Law
Dict. 1192. Even though the contract was
a parol one, 1 Hase, 158.
HILLYER and WILSON for the defendant.
The plaintift not being a party to con-
tract must clearly show that there was a
trust fund for his benefit. Hostetter v.
Hollinger, 11 Pa. 611; Torrens v. Campbell,
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74 Pa. 476; Kourtz v. Holhouse, 85 Pa. 235.
And the contract must be for his explicit
benefit. Preeman v. Pa. R. R. Co., 173 Pa.
274; Benner v. Weeks, supra; Adams v.
Kuehn, 119 Pa. 76.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The agreement between the contractor
and his employees was, that 50 cents per
month was to be withheld by the contract-
or from each laborer, for medical attend-
ance. There was no stipulation in the
agreement as to the securing of any speci-
fied physician, but he was merely to secure
medical attendance, from which we can
presume that he was to use his discretion
in the matter, and contract with any phy-
sician he desired and at any price. The
court fails to see any ambiguity in the
words of the contract, as argued by the
learned counsel for the plaintiff.
The defendant contracted with Dr. Stone
to furnish the requisite attendance, and,
having done so, he fulfilled his obligations
under the contract. The employees were
under no obligations to have Dr. Stone pro-
vide medical treatment for them, but on
the contrary, they had perfect freedom to
procure any physician they desired, but,
by doing so, they could not bind the other
party to the contract. It is a well settled
rule that no one buta party to the contract
can maintain an action on it. Freem*han v.
P. R. R. 173 Pa. 274. In the case at bar,
the plaintiff in no wise participated in the
transaction and had no knowledge of it.
The plaintiff not being a party to the con-
tract and the money not being placed in
the hands of the defendant for his use, he
cannot recover. Townsend v. Long, 27
P. F. Smith, 143.
Judgment for defendant.
WILLIAMSON, J.
OPINION OF TH'E SUPREME COURT.
The intention of the parties is not clearly
apparent, from the evidence before the trial
court. Jones was to retain 50 cents month-
ly from the wages of each workman; i. e.,
$250.00 per month. But was this retention
designed to be final? Should any particu-
lar workman not need medical attendance
during a month, was he entitled to the pay-
mentof the 50 cents? If the $250 fund was
not wholly used up, in physicians' fees, was
the unused portion to be paid to the lab-
orers, or was it to belong to Jones?
The sum of 60 cents would not be enough
to pay the fees for services becoming nec-
essary in the sickness of any particular per-
son. The intention probably was, to raise
a fund out of which, if necessary, the fees
for service to any one or more of the labor-
ers should be paid. The laborers would
form a species of beneficial society, for the
securing to such of them as should become
sick, the necessary physician's aid. Ten
might become sick, and the 490 remain
well, but the whole fund of $250 would be
consumed in furnishing the doctor for the
ten.
To carry out this object, it would be nec-
essary, in all probability, that some single
mind should have the power to make con-
tracts with the physician. It could hardly
have been intended that while A had a
right to the payment of the services of a
doctor, out of the fund, in excess of his con-
tribution to it, he was to have the power
to select the physician and make contracts
with him. Unity of fund implies unity
of administration, and the selection of a
physician to attend to the needs of the en-
tirebodyofmen. It would be possible to ob-
tain at a cheaper rate the attention of one
physician to such of 600 men as should be-
come sick, than that of 20 or 40 physicians
each for one sick man, without any pre-
arrangement for the service and compen-
sation. We are of opinion that the employ-
ment by some of the men of the physician
they pleased to employ, without regard to
the employment in behalf of the rest,
was not contemplated.
But, if we are mistaken in this, we can-
not see how Dr. Smith can recover $350.
Has Jones so much in his hands after pay-
ing $75 per month to Dr. Stone? If Jones
has so much in his hands, in excess of any
claim of other physicians than Dr. Smith,
why should he pay it to Dr. Smith?
It is said that it is money put into his
hands to be paid to Dr. Smith, that is, cer-
tain laborers have left moneys with Jones,
to be paid to such physician as they should
subsequently engage. When the money
was retained by Jones, Smith had not been
engaged. The plaintiff insists on the prin-
ciple that the money having been put into
Jones' hands for his benefit, he can
maintain an action on it. Attempts
have been made to distinguish when,
money being paid by A to B for C,
o can, and when he cannot, sue B
for it. The distinction is founded, in
Adams v. Kuhn 119 Pa. 84, and Freman v.
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R. R. Co. 173 Pa. 274, on the presence or
absence of a right in A to recover the
money from B, or, in other words on C be.
ing "the only party interested in the pay-
ment or delivery," or on B's payment toC
being for the benefit of A and enforceable
only by A. This alas! is no criterion at
all, for the question still recurs when is C
the only person interested, and when is A
the only person who can enforce the con-
tract? A careful examination of the cases
fails to discover any tangible test. We
think the learned court below reached a
correct conclusion.
Judgment affirmed.
JOHN AMBROSE, ADMt., vs. BANK.
Parol evidence - Declarations of a de-
ceased person as to pedigree-Decla-
rations only admissible when declarant
has no interest to misrepresent.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Sarah MacPherson deposited $250.00 in
the bank, taking a certificate, payable to
William MacPherson, whom she stated at
the time to be her son. After her death,
Ambrose, her administrator, demanded
the money, but bank refused to pay him.
Four years after her death, this action
was brought. No son had appeared to
claim the deposit. The administrator
offered evidence:
(1) Of persons who had known the de-
ceased for twenty years, that they had
never heard of her being married, or having
a son.
(2) Of persons who had heard her say,
both before and after the date of the de-
posit, that she had never had a son.
The jury was permitted to find that
there never had been a son, and on its ver-
dict, judgment was rendered for plaintiff.
Motion for a new trial.
BOUToN and BISHOP for plaintiff.
Pedigree or family history may be proved
by the declarations of a deceased member
of the family. People v. Fire Insurance
Co., 25 Wend. 208; Covert v. Hertzog, 4
Pa. 146; Oberstein's Appeal, 163 Pa. 14;
Greenleaf on Evidence, page 197.
YEAGLEY for defendant.
There is a presumption that one who
dies intestate leaves issue. The evidence
of those who testified to the marriage of
Sarah MacPherson and to her having a
son was not the best evidence. The dec-
larations of Sarah MacPherson, made after
the deposit, cannot be received in evidence.
Harvey v. Thornton, 14 Ill. 217; 5 W. & S.
266; Abboton Trial Evidence, 2nded., page
117; Sitter et al. v. Gehr, 105 Pa. 577.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The question before us for decision in the
ease at bar is, whether or not the evidence
(I) of persons who had known the de-
ceased, Sarah MacPherson, for twenty
years, and testified that they had never
heard of her being married or having a
son; (2) of persons who heard her say,
both before and after the date of the de-
posit, that she never had a son, is this
properly admitted? Hearsay evidenceis
admissible in' some cases; it is absolutely
necessary in cases, (1) of ecessity, i. e.,
the situation in which it is no longer
possible to subject the person to oath and
cross-examination, so that if his state-
ments are to be had at all, they must be
had without applying these securities for
trustworthiness. The typical instance of
this sort is in case of the death of pro-
posed declarant; and the question is con-
stantly presented, under several of the
exceptions, whether absence from the
jurisdiction, insanity, or the like, is to be
assimilated to the cause of death; in other
words, whether, as a general principl6, the
inavailability of the witness is a ground
for applying the exception to the rule. In
therquestion of reputation, in certain cases,
the difficulty, not of having the particular
person in court, but of getting better evi-
dence in general, is regarded as sufficient.
In the case before us, is the evidence the
best that could be had? The witnesses do
not seem to bear any relation at all to the
deceased, Sarah MacPherson, therefore, is
it the best evidence that could be obtained?
The best evidence that could have been
procured was from her family or relations,
if she had any. The facts are not clear, so
we will suppose that she had a relative;
and again, the supposition could be just as
well taken, that she did not have any rela-
tives at all. A sound general principle for
determining whose declarations are receiv-
able was laid down by Lord Eldon: "The
tradition must be from persons having
such a connectibn with the party to whom
it relates that it is natural and likely, from
their domestic habits and connections,
that they are speaking the truth, and that
they could not be mistaken." It is now
settled that the law resorts to hearsay evi-
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dence in cases of pedigree, upon the ground
of the interest of the declarants in the per-
son from whom descent is made out, and
their consequent interest in knowing the
connections of the family. The rule of ad-
mission is, therefore, restricted to the
declarations of deceased persons who were
related by blood or marriage to the person
testifying. General reputation in the
family,proved by asurvivingmemberof the
family, has also been considered as falling
within this rule. It is also proper in some
cases to hear testimony of acquaintances
and neighbors as to reputation, also reputa-
tion in the neighborhood or among ac-
quaintances generally, has often been con-
sidered admissible under local conditions.
We are of the opinion that the evidence in
the case before us, as to evidence (1) of per-
sons who had known deceased for twenty
years, that they had never heard of her
having been married, or having had a son,
was properly admitted. This is evi-
dence under the hearsay rule, that is
admissible as to deceased's general repu-
tation in the community. People who
knew of deceased's life, and were her
neighbors and acquaintances for twenty
years, are allowed to testify as to what
they know regarding deceased's reputation
and life. They seem to have been the best
witnesses obtainable, and on this point we
must say there is no error in allowing it to
go to the jury. As to the second piece of
evidence, (2) of persons who had heard her
say, both before and after the date of the
deposit, that she had never had a son, we
find no error in the first part as to state-
,ments made before the deposit, but the
9econd part we do find an error. The sec-
ond part of the above statement should not
have been allowed to go to the jury. It
was in her own interest to make such a
statement, both for her reputation's sake
and in her own interest. If it had been at
variance with her own interest, it would
have been admissible, otherwise not.
"Greenleaf on Evidence," page 282.
Whether or not Sarah MacPherson had a
son must be decided when the case goes
back for a new trial. Even Mrs. Mac-
Pherson's statement, that she had no son,
may be rebutted by the deposit in bank of
money for one Win. MacPherson. In view
of the error in second part of evidence,
submitted to the jury, we must grant the
motion for a new trial.
Motion is therefore granted.
DELANEY, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREMIE COURT.
The deposit was made by Mrs. Mae-
Pherson, and, it must be presumed, the
money belonged to her. She took a cer-
tificate, payable to Win. MacPherson,
averred by her to be her son. The only
evidence of the existence of such a person,
is this averment. If there was no such
son, the money was payable to her. Four
years have elapsed since her death, and
no son has appeared to claim the deposit.
How long before her death the deposit was
made, does not appear. If a son then
existed, there is no presumption that he
died before his mother, and if he has died
since, his administrator, not the plaintiff,
should receive the deposit from the bank.
Against the averment of the existence
of a son, there was the testimony of per-
sons who had known the deceased for 20
years, that they had never heard of her
having been married, or having had a son.
The improbability that they could not have
heard of these facts, had they been facts,
is considerable, and was properly sub-
mitted to the jury.
Her declarations before making the de-
posit, that she had never had a son, were
properly received. If she had recognized
X as her son, this recognition could have
been proven, as evidence of the relation.
A general denial that she had a son, should
be received for the same reason. The son,
were there such, would know that he was
her son, and so would others, only by her
recognition. Her disavowal of X asa son,
should be evidence that he was not. Decla-
rations may be employed to disprove, as
well asto prove, pedigree. Washington v.
Bank of Savings, 171 N. Y. 166.
The learned court below has excluded
the decedent's declarations made after the
deposit, to the effect that she had no son,
on the ground that such declarations were
in, and not against, her own interest. The
interest suggested, is the desire to avoid a
reputation for unchastity, and the desire
to make a title for herself to the deposit
which would otherwise be her son's. The
rule has been recognized that the declaraut
in pedigree eases, "must, at the time, have
no interest to misrepresent." Greenleaf
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16th Ed. p. 202. It must be conceded, we
think, that there was an apparent interest
to misrepresent. In Washington v. Bank
for Savings, 171 N. Y. 166, the represen-
tation, though made after the making of
the deposit, were held to have been
properly received, the objection urged by
the court below not having been made.
We think the case below properly decided.
Judgment affirmed.
HOLMES vs. RAILROAD CO.
Evidence-Bight of physicians to testify to
patient's admissions-Act of June 18,
1895, explained.
STATEfENT OF THE CASE.
Holmes had his foot amputated by the
car of defendant at a station. The de-
fendant alleged that Holmes had deliber-
ately placed his foot on the rail in order
that it might be run over, for the purpose
of obtaining money on an accident insur-
ance policy and also from the railroad
company.
To do this, it called the physician em-
ployed by Holmes immediately after the
accident, to testify that Holmes while suf-
fering great pain, had admitted to him
that he had purposely placed his foot on
the rail. This was stated, when not under,
and also, when under, the influence of
anaesthetics.
Verdict for defendant. Appeal.
DEvERt and COOPER for plaintiff.
Information acquired by a physician
acting, in his profession, necessary to
enable him to act in that capacity, and
which tends to blacken the character of
the patient cannot be admitted in evidence
without his consent. Actof June 18,1895,
P. L. 195, Wells v. Ins. Co., 187 Pa. 167.
Fraud tends to blacken character. 141
Pa. 214.
WILLIAMSON and WRIGHT for defend-
ant
Statements made by a patient to his
physician must be necessary to enable the
physician to treat the patient properly,
even though they do blacken character.-
Eddington v. Ins. Co., 67 N. Y. 185; Feeny
v. R. R. Co., 116 N. Y. 880; Irwin v. Keen,
3 Wharton 347.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The question involved in this case is
whether or not the attending physician
was a competent witness for the defendant
company in this action against them for
injuries, alleged by the plaintiff, to have
been received at their hands.
The company defend the action on the
grounds that plaintiff was himself respon-
sible for the injuries complained of, and
they rely on certain statements made by
plaintiff to this witness (the physician)
while the latter was caring for and wait-
ing upon the plaintiff, Holmes.
The statement which defendant com-
pany allege to have been made, was to the
effect that Holmes,plaintiffhad (while un-
der and also while not under the influence
of anssthetics) told the physician that he,
plaintiff, had deliberately placed his foot
upon a rail of defendant company's road
that it might be run over, thereby enabling
him tobring this actionfor damages against
said defendant company, and also against a
certain insurance company of which, we
presume, he was a member. The physician
is now called as a witness, to testify to the
alleged statements, and it is our duty, at
this time, to examine the respective pro-
visions of the Act above referred to, that
we may ascertain whether or not the phy-
sician is or is not a competent witness
under the circumstances.
The prohibition consists in the words,
"o person authorized, etc." shall be al-
lowed to disclose any information, because
of the professional relation between him-
self and patient. But may not statements
made to a physician when not acting in a
professional capacity and which are clearly
not necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity, be admitted? We think so, and
are unable to see how plaintiff's statement,
as to how the injury occurred could in any
sense tend to assist, the physician in the
performance of the operation, or how this
information was, in any light, necessary
to enable the attending physician to
properly perform the duties of his profes-
sion. Had the statement in question re-
sulted from, or grown out of questions
asked plaintiff concerning his condition,
we would not hesitate to say that the phy-
sician was clearly incompetent, under the
act, but such is not the case, the informa
tion was voluntarily given, and was for-
eign to anything concerning the nature of
the injury or the, method of its treatment.
"Trickett on Witnesses" refers to the
case of Wells v. New England Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 187 Pa. 166-and a reference to it
at this time, may serve to show why the
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physician's testimony in that case was by
J. Gunster held inadmissible. The state
ment made was to the effect that "sie
(Plaintiff) had had as many as six abor-
tions, had always gotten well and could
now." This being a statement that bore
directly on the object of the physician's
visit, and which would doubtless influence
him in the discharge of professional ad-
vice, can readily be distinguished from the
case at bar, for the remark here was as to
how the injury occurred, and a hope that
damages might be recovered. For the
reasons given the motion for a new trial is
overruled..
WATSON, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The incompetency created by the act of
June 18th, 1895. is (1) of one authorized to
practice physic or surgery, "and (2) with
respect to information (a) acquired" in at-
tending a patient in a professional capa-
city, which, (b) was necessary to enable
hint to act, and (c) which tends to blacken
the patient's character.
The physician employed by Holmes was
the witness. Though it does not affirm-
atively appear that he was "authorized to
practice" surgery, we cannot presume that
he was violating the law in practicing it.
.The information he obtained was not
simply that arising from his observation,
but also that communicated to him by the
patient's statement. Both of these in-
formations, we doubt not, are protected
by the act, from revelation by the surgeon.
In Wells v. N. England Mutual Life In-
surance Co., 187 Pa. 166, both species were
held protected by the lower court, that
obtained by the observation of the phy-
sician and that revealed to him by the
patient's verbal disclosures.
It is not enough that the information be
obtained "in attending a patient." Many
things not at all pertinent to his case, may
be talked of by the patient with his phy-
sician. The information must be necessary
to enable the physician to act.
Too strict an interpretation, however,
must not be placed on these words. We
take it, that if it reasonably appears that
the patient believed the communication
to be needful to enable the surgeon to
act, it will be immune from disclosure,
although in fact the surgeon might have
properly treated the case without it. Coin-
munications to an attorney are protected,
though they are not strictly relevant to
the affair committed to the attorney.
Witnesses, p. 17. The object of the act of
1895 was, we think, to permit the free
employment of a physician, without the
risk of having the information obtained by
him, as a means of performing his duties,
revealed to others. Patients are often
ignorant, or weak, and the end of the
statute would be only half accomplished,
if revelations made by them under the
belief that they were necessary, might
still be extracted from the physician, be-
cause they had not been strictly necessary.
Holmes had had his foot cut off by a
car. The service of a physician was neces-
sary. A reasonable inquiry would be, how
did the amputation occur? Whether the
surgeon asked him the question, or
whether anticipating it, Holmes answered
it, is unimportant. We think the patient
may account to the surgeon for the state
in which he is, which requires the
surgeon's aid, without the peril of having
the account revealed by the latter.
The information must tend to "blacken
the character" of the patient. We know
no scale by which we can classify the
hues of the various criminal or dishonor-
able acts of men. Some such acts may be
black, some brown, some red, and some
yellow. To impute to a man, a murder,
or rape, or robbery, or larceny, would
doubtless tend in the popular sense of the
word, to "blacken" his character. To
impute to him unchastity, or fraud, would
do the same. We are not prepared to say
that the act imputed, must be a felony,
or even a misdemeanor. The court may
judicially know that some acts, not for-
bidden by the criminal code, do 'blacken"
the character, in the sense of disgracing.
Cf. Galbraith v. Eichelberger, 3 Y, 515.
We think we shall best carry out the in-
tention of the legislature, by holding that
when the fact would disgrace, orstiginatize
the patient, if known, when the impu-
tation of it would be a slander or a libel if
untrue, the physician cannot be allowed
without the patient's consent, to reveal it.
Our conclusion is not in certain conflict
with the decision in a similar statute,
found in Green v. Met. St. Railway Co.,
171 N. Y. 201.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
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SMITH vs. DUBOIS PASSENGER
RAILWAY CO.
Bill in equity-Edsements-Ancient water
course-Secaured by grant-Bights of
dominant owner.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The defendant, an electric railway com-
pany, erected a railroad on an ancient
water course, running almost all over
it. The erection of this road was com-
menced without obtaining the permission
of the party having the easement. The
deeds were properly recorded, so that the
company had notice of this easement.
The water course could easily be detected.
Thedefendantcompany proposed to build
another water course,runningparallel with
the other water course, a few feet farther
north. The defendant wished to make
this exchange for the water course it took,
on which the road was erected.
The defendant company purchased the
land upon which the water course was
located from a third party.
There is some evidence to show that one
end of the water course had been diverted
by the owner of the fee, without any pro-
test from the holder of the dominant
estate.
The water course had not been used for
from twenty-one to thirty-six years. De-
fendant company, however, having just
taken possession a few months ago. This
is a bill in equity to restrain the company
from further prosecuting the construction
of said railroad on said water course.
Has defendant company a right to take
siaid water course without consent of holder
of dominant estate ?
GROSS and WATSON for complainant.
An easement secured by grant is not ex-
tinguished by mere non-user. Erb v.
Brown, 69 Pa. 216; Bombaugh v. Miller,
82 Pa. 203; Weaver v. Getz, 16 Pa. Sup.
418.
The company had not the right to sub-
stitute the second water course for the first.
Manaber v. Jones, 190 Pa. 171.
Street R. R. Co. cannot set up right of
eminent domain. Penna. R. R. Co. v.
Montg. Pass. Ry. Co., 167 Pa. 62; Penna.
Canal Co. v. Lewisburg Pass. Ry. Co., 10
Sup. 413.
Injunction is the proper remedy. Act
of June 19, 1871, P. L. 1360; Earley's Ap-
peal, 121 Pa. 498.
GERBER and SHERBINE for respondent.
The owner of the fee has the right to the
enjoyment f any use of his estate consist-
ent with the servitude to which it is sub-
jected. Slepenson v. Stewart, 7 Phila.
93: Clinden v. Lathrop, 21 Pick. 292:;
Am. & Eng. Encyc. (old ed.), Vol. 6, page
152; also Vol. 10, page 429.
Change of character distinguished from
change of location. Johnston v. Hyde, 32
N. J. E. 446; Allen v. Land Co., 92 Cal.
138.
Unless otherwise shown, the easement
Is in the right to the flow of the water, not
in the bed of the stream. Jackson v. Hal-
stead, 5 (Cowen) N. Y. 216.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Defendant commenced to build an elec-
tric road over an ancient water course,
without obtaining permission from the
party having the easement. The deeds
were properly recorded so that defendant
had notice of this easement. From the
above we are led to infer that this was an
artificial water course, created by grant,
since its existence was on record. Whether
its purpose was to convey water to or from
the dominant estate is immaterial. Al-
though it had not been used for from 21
years to 36 years, we do not think plaintiff
had lost his easement by abandonment.
The three 4lements of abandonment are
not present. The condition of non-user is
present, butpermitting a partial diversion
of the water course at an earlier date, does
not justify an inference that there was an
intention to abandon the water course.
Even though there was an intention to
abandon the water course, the facts 4o not
warrant the inference that defendant knew
of it, and relying upon such knowledge
began the construction of the road. Plain-
tiff has an interest in the land owned by
defendant, created by grant, conferring a
right of maintaining a water course over
landg of defendant. It remains to be con-
sidered whether defendant should be per-
mitted to alter the location of this water
course.
In Gregory v. Nelson, 41 Cal. 278, decid-
ing that a party owning a servient estate
could not substitute a flume in place of an
open ditch, court said "We know of no
principle of law or power in a court of
equity to justify or authorize such an in-
vasion of the property rights of one private
party to serve the wishes or necessities of
another priyate party. Its practical appli-
cation wouid result in a system of judicial
condemnation of property of one citizen to
answer an assumed paramount necessity
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of another citizen." In J unison v. Walker,
11 Gray 423, the owner of the dominant
estate attempted to lay water pipes in a
place other than the location of the origi-
nal grant. Although this case differs from
the one we are considering, in that the
complaint, was made by the owner of-the
servient, while here the complainant is the
holder of the dominant estate, the court
held, that the location of an easement,
when once established, cannot be altered
by either party without the consent of the
other.
In Wynkoop v. Burger, 12 Johns (N.Y.)
222, wherein the servient owner attempted
to change the location of a right of way
across his estate, the court held that it
would be extremely unjust to allow the
servient owner to he changing the road
whenever he pleased. In Johnston v.
Hyde, 32 N. J. E. 455, when the owner of
the servient estate attempted to substitute
a covered way for an open ditch, the court
held it could not compel Mr. Hyde to ac-
cept the substitute, the covered for the
open race way.
In Bannon v. Angler, 2 Allen 128, the
servient owner obstructed the easement or
way which had been created by grant, and
where there appeared to be a non-user, but
without proof of adverse enjoyment by the
owner of the servient estate. It was held
that there was not sufficient proof of aban-
donment of the way, also that the grantor
cannot defend by showinganother way in
a different line or direction, although it
may be equally convenient with the privi-
lege originally granted. In the Orphans'
Home v. The Hydraulic Association, 64
N. Y. 561, defendant was granted a right
in general terms to construct a dam. It
was held that "when the grantees located
and built their dam, the grant became and
was as specific in respect to the land to be
occupied under the grant, as if they had
been particularly described in it. From
that time neither the grantor nor the
grantees could, without the consent of the
other party in interest, change the loca-
tion of the dam." Servitudes adopted by
the owner of land, which are visible and
notorious, become, when the land is di-
vided and passes into other hands, perma-
nent appurtenances thereto, and neither
the owner of the dominant or servient por-
tions of the laud have power adversely to
interfere with the proper use and enjoy-
ment. Phillips v. Phillips, 48 Pa. 178;
Overdeer v. Updegraft, 69 Pa. 110; Man-
beck v. Jones, 190 Pa. 171. We do not
think we should consider whether com-
plainant will be injured by the construc-
tion of this road. He has a right to insist
that the easement which he is entitled to
in the servient estate shall not be inter-
fered with.
Let the injunction be granted.
PEIGHTEL, J.
BROWN vs. LIFE INSURANCE CO.
Insurance-Assignment ofpolicy-Faiure
to pay premiums-F_ aud of Insurance
Company.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Hammond, indebted to Harper in the
sum of $2,000, obtains from the defendant
compahy a policy of life insurance for
$1,500, making it payable to Harper. A
premium fell due August 11, 1900, which
has not been paid, and Hammond died
December 13, 1900.
Hammond was in the habit of paying
the premiums, but on two occasions Har-
per had inquired of the company within
thirty days after the day of payment,
whether it had been paid. Thirty days of
grace were allowed by the policy. On
August 26th, Harper inquired again
whether the premium had been paid,
and was informed by the general agent
that it had been. After Hammond's
death, he was informed that the policy
would not be paid, because the premium
had, in fact, not been paid. Hammond as-
signed the policy to Brown, who had once
been a local, agent of the company, and
who had learned that the premium had
not been paid. The assignment purported
to be for the sum $1.00, and no other con-
sideration appeared.'
YEAGLEY for plaintiff.
Harper had an insurable interest. The
Insurance Company is estopped to set up
the fact that the premium was not paid, by
the declaration of its general agent that it
had been paid. American Life and Health
Ins. Co. v. Robertshaw, 26 Pa. 189; Cun-
ninghain v. Smith, 70 Pa. 450; Carson's
Appeal, 113 Pa. 438; Smith v. Cash. Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 24 Pa. 320.
WALSH and WRIGHT for defendant.
The Insurance Company is not estopped
by statement of its agent- the premium
not having been paid within the time
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specified by the policy, the policy is abso-
lutely void. Lycoming Ins. Co. v. Ste-
Vens, 97 Pa. 354; Pottsville Ins. Co. v.
Minnegan, 100 Pa. 137; Chorteaux v.
Leech, 18 Pa. 225.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Hammond, indebted to Harper in $2,000,
obtained from defendant a policy of life in-
surance for S1,500, making it payable to
Harper. A premium fell due Aug. 11,
1900, which has not been paid, and Ham-
mond died Dec. 13, 1900. Hammond was
in the habit of payilig the premiums, but
on two occasions Harper had inquired
within thirty days after the day of pay-
ment, whether it had been paid. Thirty
days of grace were allowed by the policy.
On Aug. 26, Harperinquired again whether
the premium had been paid, and was in-
formed by the general agent that it had
been. After Hammond's death, he was
informed that the policy would not be
paid because the premium had, in fact, not
been paid. Harper assigned the policy to
Brown, who had once been a local agent
of the Company, and who had learned
that the premium had not been paid. The
assignment purported to be for $1.00, and
no other consideration appeared.
Harper was a creditor at the time the
insurance was affected, and had an insur-
able interest in the life of Hammond.
American Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Robert-
shaw, 26 Pa. 189.
The policy was for $500 less than the
amount of the debt and was taken by
Harper as collateral security for the whole
debt. His right to obtain the money on
the policy at Hammond's death was con-
tingent upon the fact that Hammond
should die before satisfying the debt.
Hammond died without satisfying the
debt and in the ordinary sequence of
things, the Insurance Co. would have to
pay Harper the amount of the policy.
The Insurance Company now claims
that the premiums were not paid when
due, before Hammond's death, and that
the policy has become void Let us take a
a resumt of the facts. The premium be-
came due Aug. 11, 1900. Thirty days of
grace in payment were allowed by the
policy. Hammond died Dec. 13, 1900. On
Aug. 26, 1900, fifteen days after the policy
became due and within the days of grace
allowed, Harper inquired of the general
agent of the Company if the premium had
been paid, and was informed that it had
been. It is clear that the premium was
not paid and the question now is, would
this defeat Harper's right of recovery on
the policy?
It is a general principle that when a
premium is not paid at the time due, the
policy becomes void. It was Hammond's
duty tosee that the premiums were paid,
and to- Harper's advantage to see them
paid. As Harper had an interest in the
policy, he had the right to inquire whether
or not the premiums were paid, and also
the right to be correctly informed to that
point. He sought the proper means of in-
forming himself and relied upon the in-
formation given. The general agent Was
a part of the Company, and no one could
be better informed. The result of his in-
formation is that the premium was not
paid. But now the Tnsurance Company
is estopped to deny that it was not paid.
Any other holding would be in effect to
allow the Insurance Company to take ad-
vantage of its own fraud. It is also well
settled that no Insurance Company can
take advantage of a deceit practiced, caus-
ing a forfeiture in order to obtain a forfeit-
ure. Helme v. Phila. Ins. Co., 61 Pa. 107.
Defendant's contention, that the policy
was void when Harper made inquiry, is
based on the claim that the days of grace
allowed was a mere allowance, revocable
at any time by the company, and that. the
company in this case" had revoked the al-
lowance before Harper inquired. It must
be noticed that the thirty days of grace
were part of the policy, the contract.
Therefore, their contention is unsound.
The case of Lantz v. Ins. Co., 139 Pa. 546,
has no application.
At Hammond's death, Harper's interest
became absolute, an interest or chose in
action assignable at will. Sibbald's Estate,
18 Pa. 249. Hence, we are unable to see
with what reason or authority the com-
pany can contest the validity of the as-
signment to Brown. Both Harper and
Brown are satisfied with the assignment,
and when the policy is paid once it will
not have to be paid again. Brown, the
plaintiff, who had been an agent of the
company, had learned that the premium
was not paid; but it does not appear
whether this knowledge came to him be-
fore the expiration of the thirty days of
grace or thereafter. In either case, the
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knowledge of Brown cannot be imputed
to Harper so as to defeat Harper's right of
action. Harper assigned a valid claim,
and Brown takes just what interest Har-
per had. The inadequacy of consideration
is not of itself evidence from which fraud
or collusion between the parties can be in-
ferred.
Judgment for plaintiff for $1,500 and
costs.
W. N. COOPER, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
One premium, that falling due on Aug.
1ltb, 1900, has not been paid and more
than the period of grace, one month, has
elapsed. This would entitle the company
to treat the contract as ended, but for the
further fact disclosed. Harper before the
lapse of 30 days, inquired of the company
whether the premium had been paid. The
company informed him that it had been.
But for this, he could, and we must as-
sume, would have paid the premium with-
in the thirty days. Whether the company
was bound to answer his inquiry or not,
it was bound if it answered at all, to
answer truly, or to give Harper an oppor-
tunity, on discovering his mistake, oc-
casioned by its error, to make the pay-
ment.
The action is for the use of Brown, who
had been local agent of the company, and
learned that the premium had not been
paid. These facts do not prevent a re-
covery. An assignment of the policy is
not vicious, because the assignee was, at a
former time, an agent of the Insurance
Company. The additional fact that, while
such, he learned that the premium had
not been paid, does not preclude his recover-
ing. He is not employing the knowledge
thus learned, to the disadvantage of his
former employer. On the contrary, he is
contending that despite that knowledge,
he has the right which his assignor had
by reason of the ignorance of the latter.
He is seeking to gain, not by the fact
which he learned, but by the supposititious
fact which his assignor was by the com-
pany's mistake, induced to believe.
But for the assignment, the company
would have been compelled to pay the
policy to Harper. His transfer of it, in
no way lessens that liability. Whether
the circumstances justify Harper rescind-
ing the transfer and appropriating the
money to himself that may be recovered
in this suit we are not called upon to de-
cide. Meeder v. Provident S. L. Ass. Co.,
171 N. Y. 432.
Judgment affirmed
